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INTRODUCTION
Information security is increasingly gaining attention of information and communication technology (ICT) specialists and system designers, but also of managers, leaders, mainstream media and broad public.
was populated with information and resources of commercial, political and social value, making them interesting catch for those whose culture and code of conduct allowed to reach for them.
The general, western individualism and materialism significantly contributed to the raising issue of information security. The care for others, for local community and for society at large is heavily shadowed, if not completely erased, by huge appetite for possession, fame and personal experience and hedonism. Thus, anything others have that can help me to have more, be more and feel better is my potential catch and target. In the same time, if something bad (like a cyber attack) is happening to my fellow or neighbor, I either don't care or that is actually good for me, because it reduces competition, and raises my image as the successful or lucky one.
The dominating philosophy that everything is allowed unless specifically forbidden, and that one can do even forbidden things if one cannot be caught, makes the whole situation even more severe.
BROADENING THE DOMAIN OF INFORMATION SECURITY TARGETS
It took quite some time for collective consciousness to become aware of the fact that critical national infrastructure is heavily dependent on ICT.
Traditionally, governments consider the critical national infrastructure to be comprised of: energy and water production and supply, food production and supply, telecommunications, transportation, financial services, health services and security services (police, military). Disruption of these services would have severe impact on functioning of society and economy. Even short disruptions of some of those services would have life threatening effects for the citizens. For instance, most households in cities do not have food supplies for more than a couple of days. Disabling transportation for just a few days on a larger scale would stop practically all activities in the affected geographical area. Long term disruption of telecommunications would result in complete loss of coordination of most of the services and society as a whole. Often overseen component of modern life is its pace. It is assumed that if any of mentioned disruptions would occur, the society could cope by returning to older methods of doing things, older way of life, at least temporarily. In practice, this is not possible, because modern society is based on processes that are interlinked in defined, tight cycles. Changing the pace of just one cycle or process would have adverse consequences on all other processes and cycles. Basically, to slow down pace of the processes, the whole society needs to be re-invented. Retail chains are re-stocked on daily basis through computerized automatic ordering. They have no storage space for stocking supplies for days' or weeks' consumption. Many information systems in retail no longer support manual cashiers and have troubles receiving cash if not on-line with their headquarters and their databases. Thus strategies for coping with attacks on critical national infrastructure cannot rely on patience and resorting to "old ways of doing things". Incident response strategies need to be in place, tested and rehearsed regularly.
Things are further complicated, because the presence and importance of information security continues to both broaden and increase, beyond the traditional notion of national critical infrastructure. This can be explained, viewed, from two perspectives. From one aspect it could be said that information security is in its quest towards areas outside of the critical national infrastructure, while from the other that information security is broadening the scope of critical infrastructure to other areas which were traditionally considered to be less important or critical. Regardless of the perspective, the consequence is the same: information security is no longer bound to the traditional circle of critical infrastructure.
It was relatively easy at the beginning to identify huge transportation systems like railroads or air traffic as being critical to a nation. Similar was with electrical energy production, water supply, transport and distribution, banks and even some strategic (private) companies. It was relatively easy, but it still took significant time (years) for information security of critical national infrastructure to become a part of national strategies and appropriate measures to be developed to protect them.
Then, it took some more time for cashless payments and medical services to receive appropriate attention. The world is intensively going towards using "plastic" or online banking for purchase and other financial transactions. Hence the world's dependence on security of financial services. Even cash transactions depend on financial services because ATMs and man-operated banking services are required to withdraw some cash from one's bank account. Similarly, there are only few medical procedures left which can be executed without use of ICT.
However, retail chains, news media and other publishers, entertainment industry, libraries and archives, educational system etc. are much more difficult to recognize both as potential targets of serious, professional cyber attacks and as being important for the existence of a nation or world globally.
Most of these targets are private organizations and because of that (unless they are banks or have important contract with the government) they are sort of "off-limits" for government bodies, regulation and attention. They also usually do have a competition. Not being a monopoly or unique in an obvious way, they do not get on the list of critical national infrastructure. But, actually, they are increasingly becoming important targets. For example, if three to five largest retailers in a geographical area get attacked in the same time and therefore their orders and inventory databases get seriously corrupted, how would they bring goods to customers? How long can citizens cope without them? Similarly, with deployment of smart grids, metering also becomes important, no longer only production and distribution of energy. Metering is used not just to send bills, but it is also important in order to anticipate network behavior and thus consumption and production needs. If metering data get corrupted, there will be serious problems with energy supply, due to incorrect predictions (Al Abdulkarim & Lukszo, 2008) .
Educational system or other large data collections related to citizens (judicial, public health …) are usually not considered to be critical systems since no immediate danger is detected or perceived stemming from their malfunctioning or corruption of their data. However, every system that holds information relevant to citizens, if corrupted in any way, will generate uneasiness, worries, tensions and potentially conflicts. For example, a combination of slow and hibernated attacks (see "New attack methods"), could corrupt educational material, or news media services and archives, polluting over a longer period of time significant share of data sources, worldwide. Once attacker finds it appropriate, true data could be compromised or previously planted information unveiled simultaneously in different locations. It would create confusion in the public, possibly even disruption of related services and would require tremendous effort, time and cost to correct the facts and eradicate falsified information. Examples could be claims about toxicity of a product, (false) data of corruption, emergency information about catastrophic event or immediate threat. Orson Welles created mass panic in 1938 with radio broadcast of his play. If an elaborated web of misinformation would be planted in worldwide media and unleashed in an orchestrated fashion, the masses could be the instrument to execute carefully constructed plan of mass destruction. Masses in panic can have destructive energy comparable to, if not greater than, nuclear weapons. Terrorists do not have to cross borders, disembark on shores. The citizens will become their soldiers, acting as planned. It is unconceivable now how would authorities restore trust in public information systems and reinstate normal life. There are no serious studies whether such attacks could be formulated as a slow attack, rather than a "blitz-krieg": if persistent poisoning of public opinion through "alternative", marginalized, "underground" sources could prepare the grounds in broad public to believe whatever lie is once launched publicly. A public poll has shown that a quarter of US citizens already believe that aliens have visited Earth (Poll, n.d.) Perhaps, one cause of problem preventing us to recognize such systems as critical stems from the fact that traditional critical infrastructure has been viewed and protected from the point of physical damage, destruction or obstruction. In all those cases, the critical national infrastructure is in one of binary states: it either operates, or doesn't. Sometimes it could operate with reduced capacity. However, it would be rare situation if it would operate wrongly. As a contrast, the primary goal of cyber attacks is not only disruption or obstruction of services. Its goal is also to copy information, without disturbing it, alter information without destroying it or even without warning others that something was changed, as well as to plant bogus information or configuration parameters defining system's behavior in some distant time point.
Also, classical risk factors for traditional critical national infrastructure would occur fast, have immediate consequence and, in most cases, would end in a matter of minutes, hours, or, in the worst case, days. Cyber attacks, on the other hand, could build up in a longer period of time, occur in milliseconds, hibernate and continue after a longer period of time, while the target would not be aware of being the target and under (ongoing) attack, at all.
After all that being said, it might seem that simply everything humans do is critical and should be the domain of national information security strategy, policy, planning and acting. However, trying to protect everything is not realistic since no one has such vast resources to take care of everything centrally, from one point. Therefore, some sort of prioritization needs to be done, and then accompanied by required action plans and activities. The domain for (national) information security needs to be defined.
In conclusion, regarding defining critical targets, the main problem becomes less the one to identify new important systems as being critical and more the one to designate with high probability any system to be of small national importance and thus less critical. ICT and information security specialists cannot give answers to these questions, other domain specialist need to be included, too. This requires involvement of broad body of domain experts in all walks of human work and life.
NEW ATTACK METHODS
Besides these new targets, new attack methods are being developed continuously. Good examples and very important are: "slow scan attacks", "hibernated attacks" and "white collar social engineering". It is virtually impossible to automatically detect these types of attacks. There are efforts to do so, but as new ways of detecting them evolve, so do new techniques of attack, as well.
Slow scan attack
For example, preparation for an attack on a system starts with information gathering. The first phase is passive data gathering from public sources, predominantly Internet. It might appear that it is not very dangerous since it provides only basic data, broadly available. However, this is not true. Besides obvious information, Internet can reveal three types of information easily overlooked.
First, there are archives of old information. We tend to forget old information we injected in cyber space once in the past, especially if they are not easily visible now, yet we use this information as passwords, to name our resources and for other purposes interesting to an attacker. Examples are: old telephone numbers, registration plates, addresses, affiliations, acquaintances, projects, talks and lectures, publications, interviews etc. It is important to be aware that sometimes Internet archives can contain information we wanted to delete and believe we managed to delete in places of their original publication, but not in archives. Archives can be browsed or searched through, but the problem is to identify them and to perform manual searches in all of them. However, other sorts of archives, in form of caches and back-ups can resurrect our deleted information. Every time anybody accesses information we injected into Internet, a copy of this information is stored in caches on their computers and, potentially, in their back-ups. Thus, in case some system somewhere crashes and back-up is used, containing also our data we deleted earlier, but after the back-up was created, this once deleted data is live and available again. Even more, our data on other people's computers are open to viruses they got infected with who can retransmit, modify and store our data in unpredictable ways. All this we cannot control and all the data are available to attackers through mere passive scanning.
Second, all sorts of technical and administrative data about users (us) are collected, stored, are retrievable and can be abused in attacks: computer names we use; access times; network addresses; domain (Internet Domain Name System = DNS) names; owners; administrators; e-mail addresses and correspondents' addresses; even encryption keys etc. They can be used to identify our systems and components and their vulnerabilities; to guess passwords; to steal our identity or to merely pretend to be us.
Third, there is information from "deep web". "Deep web" is information which is theoretically accessible by anyone, but whose address (URL = Universal Resource Locator) is not publicly available. It is not stored in any index or database and thus is not indexed by standard, public search engines like Google, Yahoo, Bing etc. This means that by merely using web search engines this information cannot be found (Deep Web, 2015) . However, this protection is volatile, since if only one time this address is published by just one person (or program, or virus), it will proliferate and sometimes, someone, sooner or later will be able to retrieve it. Other information of deep web can be stored in databases. Only very specific query into the database can retrieve that information. However, often various enquiries can be found published on the net or as a part of programs whose code is openly accessible, and all it takes is smart recombining them into search terms in order to acquire "buried" information or to scan for unknown information. In many instances this process can be automated and assigned to bots (agents).
Thus, (mere) public search for our information, especially when crafted by experienced attackers, can collect and uncover quite an amount of diverse information very useful in the attack preparation, planning and execution. Gathered information helps attackers identify services, equipment and infrastructure the victim uses; aids in guessing usernames and passwords; provides personal information needed to impersonate the victim; unveils human networks useful for spamming, hoaxing and scamming. Sometimes they even provide information suitable for blackmailing the victim or victim's contacts. All these information are extremely useful in all social engineering activities. The older the information, the more valuable.
Such data gathering is especially dangerous because it is passive: it cannot be detected by defenders. Its activities and profile are corresponding to millions of legitimate requests and are therefore indistinguishable. They are executed not on victim's computers but rather at thousands of computer servers worldwide, at random, which makes it unpredictable, untraceable and out of reach of the victim. Basically, there is nothing a target can do neither to detect nor to stop passive scanning. The only strategy is to strictly control own dissemination of information: to avoid using real identity unless really necessary of legally bounding; to refrain from publishing private and personal information; to avoid publishing other people's private and personal information as well as business one. The next step of information gathering, after completing passive scanning, is active scanning. While passive scanning yields a number of potentially useful circumstantial information, mostly about users and organizations, active scanning attempts to gather practical and direct information about technical systems comprising target's information system and holding the user data.
In active scanning the target system is exposed to various communication packets sent by the attacker. Those packets can be valid ones like millions of others received every day, invalid like those coming from poorly designed programs or misconfigured systems, or specially crafted ones usually coming from automated testing and diagnostic programs. Thus, most of them look like other, legitimate packets received every millisecond or so. The target system's response to them provides valuable information to the attacker, identifying: operating system and software tools being used; configuration settings; system performance; even hardware used. This information is then checked by attacker against databases of known vulnerabilities to reveal the victim's vulnerabilities. It is next used to choose the appropriate attack vector (method) and instruments.
Similarly, besides being directed towards systems, the active scanning can also be directed towards people using: e-mail messages, instant messaging, phone calls or face to face conversations. This type of activity is called "social engineering" and is used to extract valuable information for which much more effort and cost would be associated if attack would be aimed towards systems.
Regardless whether being directed toward systems or people, the active scanning attack can be detected if enquiries are closely spaced in time: rapid. They often present a specific pattern contrasted from normal usage. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) and Intrusion prevention systems (IPS) are relying on statistics, usage patterns, white and black lists to early detect all sorts of attacks, including active scanning attacks. In the similar way, good training and exercises can raise awareness of information system users and thus their resilience towards social engineering active scanning through their ability to recognize such enquiries.
However, if enquiries are not placed immediately one after another, but are rather spaced in time seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks or even months apart, detecting them is much more difficult (Kim & Lee, 2008) . IDS needs to analyze huge amount of data over a period of time. Despite continuous gain in speed and capacity of computers they are in continuous struggle to analyze ever increasing communication traffic. Thus logging period for IDS cannot be very long: weeks or months at most. If scanning activities are spaced in weeks or months, they are virtually undetectable to most IDSs.
If, in addition, each enquiry comes from another network location and/or person, it becomes virtually impossible to recognize them as being a part of an ongoing active scanning preceding an attack. Thus their name: "slow scan attack".
As a consequence, neither passive scans nor active slow scans can be detected while they provide to the attacker valuable information used for careful preparation and subsequent execution of the attack.
Hibernated attack
Another type of attack which is difficult to recognize is "hibernated attack". Majority of detected and reported attacks which deploy malicious code (malware) to the target system execute it immediately. Hibernated attack is when malware is activated days, weeks, months or even years after being deployed to the target system (victim) rather than immediately. In hibernated attacks, after deployment step, all traces are deleted. If no harm is done (yet) they are very difficult to detect, in most cases impossible. The effects of attack are invisible, buried, but present: the malware is hibernating. They will become apparent if and when deployed malware is activated. It can be activated in three ways: at a specific time; triggered by specific event or condition of infected system or activated externally, by attacker by a remote command. Actually, the initial perpetrator who deployed the malware need not be the one to activate it. The malware can be sold, or even rented, to somebody else.
Since the results of deployment will be visible when and if they are needed, potentially months since deployment, and since all tracks of deployment are immediately erased, and since malware can be activated by somebody else, not the original deployer, it is very difficult, mostly impossible to identify the deployer.
Things get even more complex since the deployed content need not be malware only, it can be data, too. Buried false media reports are one example. If the attackers would penetrate news media archive databases, and plant articles "revealing" dark sides of future leaders, managers etc. these forgeries cannot be detected because nobody knows what search key phrases to use. Only when it becomes opportune to the attacker, will those "news" surface. The same hoax can be planted in multitude of locations on the net which makes it more credible at the first glance and much more difficult to annihilate.
The mission to prove them false and erase them from all archives is a long, slow and expensive process. And social damage can rarely be undone. Thus, it is very difficult or impossible to trace back the deployment steps leading to perpetrators due to erased or overwritten log files and other digital traces.
Besides news media, other potential targets are: educational content, social networks, free software distribution nodes and all sorts of archives.
White collar social engineers
Another, special danger comes from new players in the field: "white collar social engineers". Social engineering is basically a collection of methods and activities which are trying to trick the victim to reveal sensitive information to the attacker (social engineer) or to perform a harmful activity without victim being aware of doing it and the harmful consequences of his actions.
Traditionally, social engineering was leveraged by attackers who have appropriate talents but are otherwise socially outcasted. They are talented and skilled to extract almost any information from the target (victim) or plant any bogus information. Social engineering relies on inherent psychological properties of an average human being: In particular, social engineering exploits ignorance, greed, curiosity, shame, fear of ridiculing, vanity, willingness to help etc. In order to be successful in complex scams, social engineer needs to get to know the victim as well as possible and thus is using techniques of passive and active information scanning. They are not limited to Internet only. "Dumpster diving" i.e. analyzing the content of waste bins, especially paper recycling bins, can provide important information. So can phone conversations, phone eavesdropping, surveillance, and other "classical" methods.
Collected information used by a skilled social engineer can trick the victim to reveal passwords, personal data or other sensitive information. It can even convince the victim to reconfigure information system or execute potentially harmful programs in order to help the attacker to later abuse the system. However, in order to create a major damage, attackers need to convince the victim to participate in more complex operations involving their profession, position, authority or other privilege in operating data and/or systems of final interest to the attacker. In order to do this the attackers need inside knowledge of the profession, trade, company, social circle of the victim. For example, to fool an investment broker, a journalist or a MD the attacker needs to understand professional terminology, procedures and know relevant players. Thus social engineers until now had to team up with a domain specialist. This presents a problem in the attack. Due to different social circles, educational levels and systems of values, these two personality types belong to separate social circles and they think, act and operate in different ways. Therefore they usually rarely came together and cooperated and if so than with difficulties and uncertain outcome. This was especially difficult if synchronous, "live" interaction with the victim was necessary because social engineer lacked domain knowledge, while domain specialist lacked social engineering skills.
However, in several past years, social engineering toolkits were developed and are published, enabling every domain specialist to plan and deploy a variety of social engineering attacks, on their own (SET, 2015) . Still, live interaction with the victim poses a problem to them, but all other methods including synchronous interaction using chat, SMS and other instant messaging techniques are now at disposal to new social engineers. These tools make it very easy, quick and effortless to create bogus, cloned websites mimicking legitimate ones but carrying malicious payload; creating and customizing malicious payload for e-mails and web sites; mass-mailing; sending e-mails and SMSes with forged sender identification, etc. Now a completely new breed of attackers is being grown. The attacks move from the realm of technology and infrastructure ("blue collars") towards the realm of data and semantics ("white collars").
Since domain specialists profoundly understand the victims in the system under attack, they are able to devise very realistic, but false, scenarios which are able to confuse and abuse the best professionals (victims) of the target system. They can build their credibility over extended period of time, using collected data to carefully carve their profile along interests and circles of the victim. In the right moment they can launch their final step, the arrowhead of the attack, finally leading to their real goal.
A simple case from end of '90-ties involved a perpetrator who infiltrated circles of card collectors by trading small quantities of collector cards of a lower value. Operating in this mode for almost a year he gained credibility as a known, fair and reliable trader. Then, he offered to the community his whole collection which he "… regrettably has to sell in order to collect money for his future, prospective business ..." Collection at sale contained, among many other cards of lower value, a few "gems": unique cards of high market value. He sold those unique cards several times to several customers, never delivered anything and vanished from the (cyber) scene. This was a simple case of standard fraud, but can demonstrate modus operandi in a more complex scenario and how much insider's knowledge it requires.
Thus, white collar social engineers are very dangerous attackers and their plots are very difficult to detect beforehand even by experts, much less by automated systems.
WHO NEEDS TO TAKE CARE ABOUT INFORMATION SECURITY?
In order for any organization, community or a nation to prevent attacks and to appropriately and timely react on attacks, "cyber defense forces" are needed. They are comprised from police, judicial system, CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Team) and other bodies, organizations and individuals whose active duty is to protect their community. These forces need to be competent in information security, active and ready.
Development of such forces is slow in most of countries. Due to national decision makers' fundamental lack of awareness of how cyber attacks might be dangerous and how probable they are in the nearest future, most of strategies and activities are aimed at training existing crime-fighters to give them competencies in information security (Robert Poepjes, 2012) . This is not a problem in itself but has often the consequence that these future cyber crime defenders will have the cyber crime fighting as their additional duty, not the only one.
This clearly demonstrates the lack of awareness and misunderstanding of both the problem and the solution on the side of decision makers, leaders and top managers.
It is not possible to create efficient defense as a side job, as yet another duty alongside the "major" one. Information security is evolving so fast that it requires defenders to be deeply involved in it on the daily basis and to sub specialize, which means that cyber defense teams need to be carefully constructed, composed, educated and led. They need to follow daily discovered and announced vulnerabilities and to take care that they are dealt with in the organization's or national critical infrastructure. They also need to study, analyze and test various published exploits, defense tools and systems. Above all, they need to monitor systems' use, analyze logs, study statistics and patterns, follow the leads and investigate. They need to check on users which means communication with them which, in turn, is very time consuming. Coordination among all specialists and forces, exchange of experience and observations, discussion of discovered vulnerabilities, irregularities and legitimate user patterns is crucial for knowledge management and overall readiness and competence. Despite high efficiency of electronic communication, in-person contacts are also necessary. Building personal networks is crucial for cyber defense since it is a very important way of quickly and timely spreading important information and crucial channel for mobilizing and offering help in crisis situations. Those networks are both networks of information sharing and networks of trust. Only through personal relationships it is possible to fully assess and apprehend an individual's competences which might be useful or even crucial in critical moments. This involves travelling to meetings, conferences and other events which is also time consuming. Thus cyber defense professionals have to spend their full time and energy on learning, observing, testing and communication, which is a full time job.
In an analogy with bush fires, cyber defense forces have a combined job of firefighters, foresters, community workers and firefighting research and development specialists.
But not even such cyber defense teams and forces are sufficient for a nation to be at par with the danger. They are necessary but not sufficient.
A battle of unequal rivals
There are far too many systems to protect or to merely control (as a potential source of an attack) and they grow like mushrooms after the rain, daily. Cyber defense forces cannot efficiently counteract them, because there are simply too few of them. They form the defense core but cannot interact with the whole critical domain and dangerous systems.
In addition, new types of attacks evolve and develop too fast for defense forces to be promptly competent to detect them and react appropriately. New attacks need first to be detected, their properties recognized, anatomy studied and countermeasures developed and tested. Only then the defense actions can begin, while the attackers can spend all the time they need to invent, develop and test attack methods and tools . Such scenarios have been researched, reported to governments and published as works o fiction, but highly realistic fiction (Schwartau, 2002) . They can do that in complete isolation, in their own development environment and test beds, detached from Internet. They can be completely undetectable, hidden and protected. Thus defense forces cannot observe them while attack is being prepared. Only when the method and tools are tested and prepared need attackers to surface and attach to the public infrastructure. And even then, only for a brief moment. They need just a few seconds or even less to connect, inject the attack in the system and detach again. They can do it using anonymous, public access wired or wireless networks or broken-in private systems. They can use vulnerable systems they infected months earlier or those compromised but some other attackers. While connecting their equipment to public infrastructure they can use new, disposable, clean equipment without any information that could reveal their identity. They can do it just anywhere in the world. Thus it is completely impossible to ambush them, to wait for them and catch them in that very brief moment when they inject their attack into the public infrastructure. By starting the attack in vulnerable, compromised systems, they make sure no logging mechanism will record their steps. So, even when (if) defense forces identify the origin of the attack, they will find no tracks lading them to real perpetrators.
Finally, most of cyber attacks start a bush-fire like series of events spreading and multiplying in literally fractions of seconds over a vast, global infrastructure. Thus humans have to fight enemy who in thousand fold faster. The defenders need first to detect the attack at all, then analyze the event and situation, recognize the method and tools used and their properties, assess the future development, develop options, perform defense feasibility study, asses possible collateral damages, make strategic and tactical decisions, mobilize all involved in defense, create consensus about further actions, develop appropriate methods and tools and finally deploy them. Then the effect needs to be monitored, data collected and analyzed and corrections defined and implemented.
All this will be happening while the attack multiplies and spreads in milliseconds through thousands, possible millions of computerized devices. And those devices are not passive, just being compromised, rather they take active part as being infected, thus adding their processing power to the attack. As internet of things is developing, potential number of devices participating in the attack grows exponentially. The attacking force grows in strength exponentially as the time passes by. Thus, the attack is executed and spread in milliseconds and seconds, while defenders work in minutes, and hours, sometimes days. Defenders are counted in tens, maybe hundreds of humans, while attackers are computers, numbered in thousands and millions. This is a battle of unequal rivals (Bowden, 2012) . Hence, cyber defense forces need assistance. And this assistance must come much earlier than the attack actually begins.
Cyber defense forces need active assistance
As information security attacks are spreading from traditional, closed circles to a much broader professional community, a natural question arises: "Who needs to take care about information security?" Until recently, it was believed that information security is predominantly a part of ICT and that only ICT specialists need to pay attention to information security. Even among them it was considered to be the job of only those specialized for information security. Now it is understood that all ICT specialists need to understand information security and take care of it. For example, it is now clear and undoubtful that vulnerability of (web) applications can be reduced and eliminated only if application designers, developers and testers are competent in information security. The same goes for database designers and other sub-professions of ICT. The way they design computer applications and information systems, the way they deploy them, configure and maintain defines how secure they are, or how vulnerable they are. There are decades old debate and flame wars of proprietary software versus FLOSS (Free/libre open source software) (FLOSS, 2015) . There is growing research based evidence in favor of using FLOSS as products of trustworthy production process (Petrinja & Succi, 2010) .
Maintaining systems is the second key component. As new vulnerabilities are detected, new attack methods identified, developers strive to provide protection by improving their products as soon as possible. This is the battle of unequal rivals, as explained in previous chapter. However, once they succeed, it is critical how fast will their countermeasures be applied and implemented. It is somewhat unexpected, but significant damage to a large number of worldwide systems comes from malware which is several years old. This clearly shows how important it is that professionals in charge of maintaining information systems get appropriate awareness and education in order to be fully competent in information security and to react promptly. Monitoring systems they are entrusted with, being promptly informed of latest threats in information security, checking for vulnerabilities of their systems and implementing updates and patches needs to be a high priority in their job description.
However, traditional view that only ICT specialists involved with critical infrastructure need to be competent and ready is no longer appropriate. It was already discussed how difficult it is to pronounce a system as not being critical. But even if it were so, if vulnerable and unprotected this system will serve as part of an attacker's botnet and contribute to attacker's strength. Therefore all those who take care of ICT infrastructure in general need to be information security competent, ready and alert, too (Rushkoff, n.d.) .
Unfortunately, this isn't sufficient, neither. Even if all ICT professionals would be information security competent, this would not be sufficient, not even today, and especially not in the future. The problem lies in complexity of systems that use ICT. ICT is irreversibly intertwined with systems they serve, monitor or control. In order to understand intricate vulnerabilities of systems as a whole and possible consequences of even minor deviations from regular operations requires in depth understanding of the whole system which requires domain knowledge, not only ICT competence. This is where domain experts are unavoidable and actually are the key resource in protecting systems. It becomes increasingly difficult to find a system which is isolated from other systems. Usually every system is in interaction with other systems if not any system, through global Internet. This further increases the complexity of systems and complexity of the task to make them safe and secure. Competence in just one domain is no longer sufficient. Clusters of domain competences are required in order to asses, forecast and plan systems' safety and security as well as their tight cooperation in a case of a security incident. Examples are smart metering systems, electrical power distribution systems, transportation systems and electricity production systems. They all are separate and have their respective information systems. However, in order to achieve efficiency, productivity and high level of service, they are getting connected and their automatic interaction is desirable and required. As a consequence, the malfunctioning of one system is going to have influence on other connected systems. Technical and natural causes of problems can be and usually are taken in consideration as early as in the design phase. However, dangerous events and incidents caused by malicious people are almost impossible to predict beforehand and once for all times. The nature of security problems caused by people is such that most of them have to happen first, the method and technique developed and demonstrated and only then countermeasures are designed, tested and implemented.
In addition, special problem comes from the fact that significant number of security incidents in all sorts of systems based on or supported by information and communication technology is caused by current or ex employees, the people with high domain knowledge and deep insight in system's specifics (Walker, 2014) .
THE ROLE OF DOMAIN PROFESSIONALS
In the example of white collar social engineering it is obvious that in order to recognize such threat and underlying vulnerabilities as well as to assess risks, ICT knowledge is not the key. Information security professionals do not have all required competencies. Professional competencies in the victim's domain are the key. Thus professionals in a specific domain need to get appropriate trainings in the field of information security, applied to their domain.
From the vey inception of a system, the idea, through defining system requirements, feasibility assessment, design, testing, deployment all the way to configuration, maintenance and management of the system, care about information security needs to be taken. This care has to be taken by all involved in those processes, which spawns across a number of domains. All included and participating in these processes need to be competent in information security.
Domain professionals need to thoroughly consider critical functionalities of the system they are going to build, are deploying or taking care of. Sources of incoming information and ways and means to verify and validate them and their sources need to be defined in a safe, secure and rugged way. Outgoing information need to be considered, as well. Their confidentiality and publishability need to be strictly defined. Identification of systems eligible for their reception needs to be established. Means for other systems and users to verify and validate outgoing information and their source need to be provided. Interaction with other systems and mutual authentication need to be designed.
Complex systems usually have many users and operators. Since many security incidents are caused by users, current and previous (Walker, 2014) , user rights and their management are crucial. It is important to define user roles and hierarchies, their rights and constraints: data and operations they are authorized for, times they can work at, locations they can access system from and other specifications relevant for controlled access to data. Appropriate usage information logging is essential for detecting usage pattern deviations in order to detect security breeches.
A variety of systems controlled by ICT have numerous physical and electronic peripheral components. Manipulating them can significantly influence the whole process and performance of the system as a whole. Attaching unexpected sensors or peripheral devices, submitting unusual input data, disabling output data recipients and similar irregularities cause corrupted output data, can get system in undesirable state and can even render the whole system unusable or blocked. Domain professionals need to develop a variety of such scenarios in order to identify vulnerabilities and possible attack vectors upfront for systems to be secured and defense prepared. In order to do that they need solid education both in their professional domain as well as in the field of information security.
They also need to tightly communicate and cooperate with professionals in other domains relevant for their system. In order to do that they need at least some basic knowledge in those other domains.
So, it becomes clear that education is the key component to the security of a society as a whole. No longer just ICT professionals, but all professions need to receive (at least basic) information security education, regardless what their basic profession is and what type of job do they have. Of course, this education has to be practical and tailored to their work environment.
Education for information security needs to become mandatory and integral part of every profession's basic education, professional continuous education and lifelong education in general. Professional certifications need to have part related to information security. Renewing of certificates and other credentials has to require some points in continuous upgrading of competences in information security. This is crucial since information security competencies cannot be acquired once and for all. Due to very fast development of new attack methods, techniques and tools as well as rapid development of information and communication technology, products and services in general, continuous, life-long education is needed.
DIFFICULTIES IN TRAINING DOMAIN PROFESSIONALS FOR INFORMATION SECURITY
The speed of change in globalized world, ICT and information security in particular, requires continuous, almost daily learning. This creates significant burden, both mentally, financially and time wise. Certain level of relief can be achieved leveraging e-learning. E-learning provides ability to learn by oneself, asynchronously from other people or events and adjusted to own needs and capabilities. However it does require continuous upgrade of learning content and disciplined, regular learning.
Unfortunately, this is not the end of problems. Preparing protection from an attack means anticipating it. But, predicting new attacks requires a specific mindset which is usually not found in "ordinary" professionals. Professionals are typically trained to improve the efficiency and responsiveness of processes, methods, techniques, tools and systems they are in charge of. They are not trained to think how to misuse the object of their work. They are not trained to acquire the mindset of an attacker. This is not easy to achieve, cannot be achieved by everyone and often is not productive because professionals have different agenda from the attackers in the first place. Thus the solution is not to convert professionals in attackers but rather to give them capability to switch perspectives and view their system from all of them. Therefore, specific exercises need to be carried out (periodically) to seek vulnerabilities, devise attack concepts, test them and design methods to prevent the: to forecast, to predict, to increase readiness. Training exercises are important and inseparable part of education and readiness.
These exercises, besides being part of basic education in information security for every profession as well as part of professional lifelong, continuous education and certification need to be organized by professional associations, government agencies and international bodies. They also have to be organized by companies, organizations and institutions who own information and other domain specific systems, themselves.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, information security needs to become a part of every profession's curricula, not just ICT's. In every profession, future practitioners need to be trained to understand the importance, both of the processes and data they handle or work with and their vulnerabilities. They need to be familiar with the methods and techniques attackers use. They should be encouraged to creatively discover the value of their data and systems, their implications and side effects on the large scale and to think of possible abuses. And, finally, they need to be guided in training sessions trying to acquire the attacker's mindset in attempt to predict attacks and their properties in order to be able to protect systems they have been trusted with.
